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The Macroeconomics Of Money Market Freezes

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  • Max Bruche

    ()
    (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)

  • Javier Suarez

    ()
    (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros)

Abstract

This paper develops a tractable general equilibrium model in which money markets provide structural funding to some banks. When bank default risk becomes significant, retail deposit insurance creates an asymmetry between banks that operate in savingsrich regions, which can remain financed at cheap risk-free rates, and in savings-poor regions, which have to pay either large spreads in money markets or high rates for the scarce regional savings. We show that this asymmetry can cause a severe distortion of the aggregate allocation of credit. When interdependencies across borrowers are large (e.g., via demand externalities), output and welfare losses are also large and can be dramatically reduced by an aggressive subsidization of money market borrowing. The analysis offers some insights on the rationale for responding to a money markets freeze with full-allotment fixed-rate lending policies by central banks or the extension of government guarantees on non-deposit liabilities.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CEMFI in its series Working Papers with number wp2009_0901.

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Date of creation: Jun 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2009_0901

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References

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  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
  2. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability? An Empirical Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1751, Econometric Society.
  3. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
  4. Bolton, Patrick & Freixas, Xavier, 2001. "Corporate Finance and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
  6. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2005. "The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements," 2005 Meeting Papers 880, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Heider, F. & Hoerova, M. & Holthausen, C., 2009. "Liquidity Hoarding and Interbank Market Spreads: The Role of Counterparty Risk," Discussion Paper 2009-40 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2008. "The Procyclical Effects of Basel II," CEPR Discussion Papers 6862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Huang, Rocco & Ratnovski, Lev, 2011. "The dark side of bank wholesale funding," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 248-263, April.
  10. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 14-23.
  11. Césaire Meh & Kevin Moran, 2008. "The Role of Bank Capital in the Propagation of Shocks," Working Papers 08-36, Bank of Canada.
  12. Xavier Freixas & José Jorge, 2008. "The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(6), pages 1151-1176, 09.
  13. Williamson, Stephen D, 1987. "Financial Intermediation, Business Failures, and Real Business Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1196-1216, December.
  14. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October.
  15. Viral V. Acharya & Denis Gromb & Tanju Yorulmazer, 2012. "Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 184-217, April.
  16. Romer, David, 1985. "Financial intermediation, reserve requirements, and inside money: A general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 175-194, September.
  17. Chen, Nan-Kuang, 2001. "Bank net worth, asset prices and economic activity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 415-436, October.
  18. Skander Van den Heuvel, 2006. "The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy," 2006 Meeting Papers 512, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Poor macroeconomics of money market freezes
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2009-06-12 23:20:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Manuel Arellano & Lars Peter Hansen & Enrique Sentana, 2009. "Underidentification?," CeMMAP working papers CWP24/09, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  2. Florian Heider & Marie Hoerova, 2009. "Interbank Lending, Credit-Risk Premia, and Collateral," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 5(4), pages 5-43, December.
  3. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  4. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity Of Mixed Equilibria In Mechanisms: A Unified Approach To Exact And Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
  5. Roberto Serrano, 2009. "On Watson'S Non-Forcing Contracts And Renegotiation," Working Papers wp2009_0907, CEMFI.
  6. Max Bruche, 2009. "Bankruptcy Codes, Liquidation Timing, And Debt Valuation," Working Papers wp2009_0902, CEMFI.

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