Ex Post Information in Auctions
AbstractWhen buyers' private information about the value of an item for sale is correlat ed, the seller can increase expected revenue in a sealed bid auction. Specifically, revenue can be increased by making the payment a funct ion of all the losing bids. In addition, there are gains to making th e payment contingent upon some signal of the object's value which bec omes public at a later date. That is, there are gains to introducing positive royalty value. Copyright 1988 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 367.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 1986
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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- John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979.
UCLA Economics Working Papers
152, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
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