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Collusion and the Choice of Auction

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Author Info
Marc S. Robinson (UCLA)
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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp340.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 340.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 1984
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:340

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1983. "Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 254, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  4. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction," Discussion Papers 462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Sergio O. Parreiras, 2006. "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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