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Collusion and the Choice of Auction

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  • Marc S. Robinson

    (UCLA)

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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp340.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 340.

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    Date of creation: 01 Sep 1984
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:340

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    Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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    1. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
    3. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Weber, Robert J., 1982. "The value of information in a sealed-bid auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 105-114, June.
    5. Eric Maskin & John G. Riley, 1983. "Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 254, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:
    1. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers 292, UCLA Department of Economics.

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