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Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice

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Marc S. Robinson (UCLA)
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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp292.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 292.

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Date of creation: 01 Sep 1984
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:292

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. David C. Nellor & Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Binding Future Governments: Tax Contracts and Resource Development," UCLA Economics Working Papers 297, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Douglas K. Reece, 1978. "Competitive Bidding for Offshore Petroleum Leases," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 369-384, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wilson, Robert, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(3), pages 511-18, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Leland, Hayne E, 1978. "Optimal Risk Sharing and the Leasing of Natural Resources, with Application to Oil and Gas Leasing on the OCS," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 413-37, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Daniel A Artana, 1989. "Las Regulaciones a los Hidrocarburos en Argentina: El Costo de los Controles de Precios," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 26(78), pages 263-280. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Collusion and the Choice of Auction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 340, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Marc S. Robinson, 1985. "The Welfare Cost of Resource Taxation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 376, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. John G. Riley, 1986. "Ex Post Information in Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers 367, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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