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To Harvest Or Not To Harvest? An Analysis Of Cutting Behavior On Federal Timber Sales Contracts

Author

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  • Rucker, Randal R.
  • Leffler, Keith B.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Rucker, Randal R. & Leffler, Keith B., 1986. "To Harvest Or Not To Harvest? An Analysis Of Cutting Behavior On Federal Timber Sales Contracts," Department of Economics and Business - Archive 259420, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ncbuar:259420
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.259420
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael J. Boskin & Marc S. Robinson & Terrance O'Reilly & Praveen Kumar, 1984. "New Estimates of the Value of Federal Mineral Rights and Land," NBER Working Papers 1447, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    3. Smith, James L, 1982. "Equilibrium Patterns of Competition in OCS Lease Sales," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(2), pages 180-190, April.
    4. Douglas K. Reece, 1979. "An Analysis of Alternative Bidding Systems for Leasing Offshore Oil," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(2), pages 659-669, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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