Clustering the Winners: the French Policy of Competitiveness Clusters
AbstractIn 2005 the French government launched a policy of competitiveness clusters, giving subsidies for innovative projects managed locally and collectively by firms, research centers and universities. This paper proposes an ex-ante analysis of the outcome of the selection process that took place before the implementation of the subsidies program, in order to assess whether the policy ended up in choosing winners or losers. We first ask how the clusters have been selected, and then focus on the selection of firms within the clusters, using export and productivity as a measure of performance. Our main conclusion is that public authorities have chosen the winners during the two-step selection procedure. Export premium, beyond what individual characteristics would predict, is however most visible within the category of clusters having no international ambition, where heterogeneity among firms is the largest.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPII research center in its series Working Papers with number 2010-18.
Date of creation: Sep 2010
Date of revision:
Competitiveness; Clusters; International Trade; Firm selection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-09-25 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INT-2010-09-25 (International Trade)
- NEP-SBM-2010-09-25 (Small Business Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zvi Griliches & Jacques Mairesse, 1995.
"Production Functions: The Search for Identification,"
NBER Working Papers
5067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Zvi Griliches & Jacques Mairesse, 1995. "Production Functions: The Search for Identification," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1719, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Z, Griliches & Jacques Mairesse, 1997. "Production Functions : The Search for Identification," Working Papers 97-30, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
- Philippe Martin & Thierry Mayer & Florian Mayneris, 2011.
"Public support to clusters. A firm level study of french 'local productive systems',"
Sciences Po publications
info:hdl:2441/c8dmi8nm4pd, Sciences Po.
- Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2011. "Public support to clusters: A firm level study of French "Local Productive Systems"," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 108-123, March.
- Florian Mayneris & Thierry Mayer & Philippe Martin, 2008. "Public support to clusters : a firm level study of French "local productive systems"," Sciences Po publications 7102, Sciences Po.
- Martin, Philippe & Mayer, Thierry & Mayneris, Florian, 2008. "Public Support to Clusters: A Firm Level Study of French “Local Productive Systems”," CEPR Discussion Papers 7102, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- MARTIN, Philippe & MAYER, Thierry & MAYNERIS, Florian, . "Public support to clusters. A firm level study of French "Local Productive Systems"," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2287, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007.
"Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 5(5), pages 1064-1093, 09.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and asymmetric lobbying: why governments pick losers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19726, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, 2007. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," CEP Discussion Papers dp0791, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Richard E. Baldwin & Frederic Robert-Nicoud, 2002. "Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers," NBER Working Papers 8756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael E. Porter, 2000. "Location, Competition, and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 14(1), pages 15-34, February.
- Jaffe, A.B. & Trajtenberg, M., 1992.
"Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations,"
14-92, Tel Aviv.
- Jaffe, Adam B & Trajtenberg, Manuel & Henderson, Rebecca, 1993. "Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(3), pages 577-98, August.
- Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg & Rebecca Henderson, 1992. "Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by Patent Citations," NBER Working Papers 3993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Uwe Cantner & Holger Graf & Susanne Hinzmann, 2013. "Policy induced innovation networks: the case of the German "Leading-Edge Cluster competition"," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-008, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Lionel Fontagné & Matthieu Crozet, 2010. "L'internationalisation des entreprises : une analyse microéconomique de la mondialisation," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 435(1), pages 3-12.
- Christian Schröder, 2014. "Dynamics in ICT cooperation networks in selected German ICT clusters," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 197-230, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.