"My friends: it would be an error to accept": Communication and group identity in a bargaining setting
AbstractIn this paper we introduce communication into intergroup ultimatum bargaining in a lab. The responder groups vote whether to accept the proposals with unanimity required either for acceptance or for rejection. In contrast with the no-communication results reported in our previous study (Elbittar, Gomberg and Sour 2011), the group decision rule does affect the individual voting behavior when subjects are allowed to exchange messages before voting. In fact, when acceptance is the default, subjects become substantially more likely to vote to reject an offer. As a result, the formal group decision-making rule turns out to have little impact on group decisions, which follow the behavior of the more confronational subjects, as predicted by the "group discontinuity hypothesis" of the psychological literature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM in its series Working Papers with number 1203.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Bargaining games; group decision making; communication and experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-10-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2012-10-13 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-10-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-13 (Game Theory)
- NEP-POL-2012-10-13 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Game Theory and Information
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0407, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Laura Sour, 2004. "Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000267, David K. Levine.
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"Bargaining with Private Information,"
90-01rev, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
- Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
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