Decision costs in legislative bargaining: An experimental analysis
AbstractWe conduct an experiment to assess the effects of different decision rules on the costs of decision making in a multilateral bargaining situation. Specifically, we compare the amount of costly delay observed in an experimental bargaining game under majority and unanimity rule. Our main finding is that individual subjects are more likely to reject offers under unanimity rule. This increased rejection rate, as well as the requirement that all subjects agree, leads to more costly delay. This result provides empirical support for a classic argument in favor of less-than-unanimity decision rules put forth by Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Nuffield College in its series Discussion Papers with number 2011002.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Collective decision-making; Majority rule; Unanimity; Legislative bargaining; Experimental economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Luis Miller & Christoph Vanberg, 2013. "Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 373-394, June.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2011-01-30 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-01-30 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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DFAEII Working Papers
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