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Veto power in committees: an experimental study

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  • John Kagel

    ()

  • Hankyoung Sung
  • Eyal Winter

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-010-9234-8
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 13 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 167-188

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:2:p:167-188

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: Veto power; Bargaining; Committees; C7; D7; C78; D72;

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References

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  1. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2007-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Frechette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo, 2005. "Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 365-390, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Guillaume R. Frechette & John H. Kagel & Massimo Morelli, 2010. "Pork Versus Public Goods: An Experimental Study of Public Good Provision Within a Legislative Bargaining Framework," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute ECO2010/37, European University Institute.
  2. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, . "Gaining Power through Enlargement: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 09/30, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Luis Miller & Christoph Vanberg, 2013. "Decision costs in legislative bargaining: an experimental analysis," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 373-394, June.
  4. Miller , Luis & Vanberg, Christoph, 2014. "Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining," Working Papers 0558, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
  5. R. Bosman & P. Maier & V. Sadiraj & F. van Winden, . "Let Me Vote! An experimental study of vote rotation in committees," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University 2006-18, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Aug 2013.
  6. Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe & Gabriele Esposito & Xiaoyan Lu, 2011. "A Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment: Human Mistakes in Cooperative Games," Working Papers halshs-00645867, HAL.

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