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A Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment: Human Mistakes in Cooperative Games

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  • Eric Guerci

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - CNRS : UMR6579, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - CNRS : UMR7321 - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis [UNS])

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - CNRS : UMR6579, Economics Department - Université de Tsukuba)

  • Naoki Watanabe

    ()
    (Economics Department - Université de Tsukuba)

  • Gabriele Esposito

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - CNRS : UMR6579)

  • Xiaoyan Lu

    ()
    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - CNRS : UMR6579)

Abstract

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the following two features of the protocol by Montero et al. (2008): (a) the way subjects' roles are reassigned in each round (random versus semi-fixed roles) and (b) the number of proposals that subjects can approve simultaneously (multiple versus single approval). We found that the possibility of simultaneously approving many proposals (multiple approvals) may result in more confusion and mistakes by subjects than the case without such a possibility (single approval). We also found that frequencies of minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) observed under the protocol with semi-fixed roles and single approval are consistent with our hypothesis: each subject prefers a MWC in which his or her relative weight is larger, and the probability of each MWC occurring depends on a score in the social ordering determined by the Borda count, when there is no veto player.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00645867.

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Date of creation: 28 Nov 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00645867

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Related research

Keywords: weighted voting; experiment; cooperative game; mistakes; winning coalition;

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  1. Chou, Eileen & McConnell, Margaret & Nagel, Rosemarie & Plott, Charles R., 2007. "The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “Guessing” game," Working Papers 1274, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. John Kagel & Hankyoung Sung & Eyal Winter, 2010. "Veto power in committees: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
  4. Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2005. "Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study," Discussion Papers 2005-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  5. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Matthias Weber, 2014. "Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-042/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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