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The Paradox of New Members in the Council of Ministers: A Noncooperative Approach

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Author Info
Maria Montero () (University of Nottingham)

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Abstract

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper shows that the paradox has theoretically occurred in the EU using the leading model of legislative bargaining. Furthermore, it is possible for a majority of members to be in favor of enlargement, even if voters are bargaining over a fixed budget.

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File URL: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/2007-12.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007-12.

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Date of creation: Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-12

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Related research
Keywords: legislative bargaining; weighted voting; power measures; EU enlargement; paradox of new members;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2008. "Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 69-87, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 1999. "A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice," Working Papers 1053, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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