Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?
AbstractNeither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 4555.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
contracts; hold-up problem; separate-property marriage; community-property marriage; divorce legislation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
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