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The Economics of Pending Patents

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  • Johannes Koenen

    ()

  • Martin Peitz

Abstract

We provide a treatment of a number of questions pertaining to pending patents – a subject that has so-far mainly been discussed en-passant in the existing literature. We present the underlying institutional and legal framework that governs pending patents and some basic facts related to them. Then, we focus on the strategic considerations of firms in the earliest stage of the patenting process and the interplay with the patent office. This is followed by considering the perspective of the patent and trademark offices (PTOs), in particular, acknowledging the limited resources that are available to PTOs. Finally, we investigate the potential abuse of pending patents and the role of reputation of patenting firms.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2011/wp-cesifo-2011-11/cesifo1_wp3657.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3657.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3657

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Related research

Keywords: patenting; pending patents; innovation; patent office overload; patent inspection; grant delays;

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References

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  1. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe, 2010. "The Quality Factor in Patent Systems," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2010-027, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Nancy T. Gallini, 2002. "The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 131-154, Spring.
  3. Johnson, Daniel K N & Popp, David, 2003. " Forced Out of the Closet: The Impact of the American Inventors Protection Act on the Timing of Patent Disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 96-112, Spring.
  4. Iain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, 2009. "Patents, Thickets and the Financing of Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 729-773, 09.
  5. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2008. "Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk
    [Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  6. Pierre R�Gibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2010. "INNOVATION CYCLES AND LEARNING AT THE PATENT OFFICE: DOES THE EARLY PATENT GET THE DELAY? -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 222-246, 06.
  7. Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.
  8. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, 2004. "Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
  9. Johannes Koenen & Martin Peitz, 2013. "Firm Reputation and Incentives to "Milk" Pending Patents," CESifo Working Paper Series 4355, CESifo Group Munich.
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Cited by:
  1. Yamauchi, Isamu & Nagaoka, Sadao, 2014. "An Economic Analysis of Deferred Examination System: Evidence from Policy Reforms in Japan," IIR Working Paper 14-05, Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University.

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