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Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts

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  • Schankerman, Mark
  • Schütt, Florian

    (Tilburg University, TILEC)

Abstract

We develop an integrated framework to study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening. We focus on four key policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that there are important complementarities among these instruments, and identify conditions under which they can be used to achieve either partial or complete screening. We simulate the model to study the welfare effects of different policy reforms. We show that intensifying patent office examination, frontloading patent fees and capping litigation costs all generate welfare gains, while replacing examination with a pure registration system reduces welfare.
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Suggested Citation

  • Schankerman, Mark & Schütt, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts," Discussion Paper 2016-036, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutil:e9210a8e-ff3b-4f03-823b-a7140601014b
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2001. "Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(1), pages 129-151, Spring.
    2. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 2005. "Probabilistic Patents," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 75-98, Spring.
    3. Florian Schuett, 2013. "Patent quality and incentives at the patent office," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 313-336, June.
    4. Caillaud, Bernard & Duchêne, Anne, 2011. "Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 242-252, March.
    5. Nicholas Bloom & Mark Schankerman & John Van Reenen, 2013. "Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1347-1393, July.
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    7. Mark A. Lemley, 2013. "Fixing the Patent Office," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 83-100.
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    9. Paul Klemperer, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
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    13. Galasso, Alberto & Schankerman, Mark, 2015. "Patents and cumulative innovation: causal evidence from the courts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 61614, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    23. Lanjouw, Jean O & Schankerman, Mark, 2004. "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 45-74, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Adam B. Jaffe, 2018. "Are patent fees effective at weeding out low‐quality patents?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 134-148, March.
    2. Nancy Gallini, 2017. "Do patents work? Thickets, trolls and antibiotic resistance," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 50(4), pages 893-926, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    innovation; patents; screening; litigation; courts; patent fees;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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