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The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation

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  • Alessandro Cigno

Abstract

The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2005/wp-cesifo-2005-12/cesifo1_wp1632.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1632.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1632

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Keywords: intergenerational cooperation; family; fertility; saving; private transfers; education; child benefits; pensions; self-enforcing constitutions; direct democracy; representative democracy; constitutions;

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References

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  1. Esteban, J.M. & sakovics, J., 1992. "Intertemp[oral Transfer Institutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 172.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  2. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2000. "Endogenous Fertility And The Design Of Family Taxation," CHILD Working Papers wp03_00, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  3. Eckstein, Zvi & Wolpin, Kenneth I., 1985. "Endogenous fertility and optimal population size," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 93-106, June.
  4. van Groezen, Bas & Leers, Theo & Meijdam, Lex, 2003. "Social security and endogenous fertility: pensions and child allowances as siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 233-251, February.
  5. Caillaud, B. & Cohen, D., 2000. "Inter-generational transfers and common values in a society," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1091-1103, May.
  6. Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The Politics of Intergenerational Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(2), pages 335-57, April.
  7. Martin Kolmar, 1997. "Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-356.
  8. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
  9. Baland, J.M. & Robinson, J.A., 1998. "Rotten Parents," Papers 207, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
  10. Robert Kollmann, 1997. "Endogenous fertility in a model with non-dynastic parental altruism," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 87-95.
  11. Breyer, Friedrich, 1994. "The political economy of intergenerational redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 61-84, May.
  12. Veall, Michael R., 1986. "Public pensions as optimal social contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 237-251, November.
  13. Boldrin, Michele & Rustichini, Aldo, . "Equilibria with social security," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3903, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  14. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  15. Hansson, Ingemar & Stuart, Charles, 1989. "Social Security as Trade among Living Generations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1182-95, December.
  16. Pecchenino, R.A., 1994. "Social Security, Social Welfare and the Aging Population," Papers 9403, Michigan State - Econometrics and Economic Theory.
  17. Docquier, Frederic & Michel, Philippe, 1999. " Education Subsidies, Social Security and Growth: The Implications of a Demographic Shock," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(3), pages 425-40, September.
  18. Verbon, Harrie, 1993. "Public Pensions: The Role of Public Choice and Expectations," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 123-35, May.
  19. Andreas Wagener, 2003. "Pensions as a portfolio problem: fixed contribution rates vs. fixed replacement rates reconsidered," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 111-134, 02.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Javier Birchenall & Rodrigo Reis Soares, 2007. "Altruism, Fertility, and the Value of Children: Health Policy Evaluation and Intergenerational Welfare," Textos para discussão 537, Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil).
  2. Ana Fernandes, 2011. "Altruism, labor supply and redistributive neutrality," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 1443-1469, October.
  3. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Eduardo L. Giménez & Mikel Pérez-Nievas, 2010. "Millian Efficiency with Endogenous Fertility," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 154-187.
  4. Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/167, Université Paris-Dauphine.
  5. Wolff, François-Charles, 2006. "Les transferts ascendants au Bangladesh, une décision familiale?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 271-316, mars-juin.
  6. repec:ese:iserwp:2006-13 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini, 2006. "Optimal Policy Towards Families with Different Amounts of Social Capital, in the Presence of Asymmetric Information and Stochastic Fertility," CESifo Working Paper Series 1664, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Michele Boldrin & Ana Montes, 2009. "Assessing the efficiency of public education and pensions," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 285-309, April.
  9. Gil Epstein, 2006. "The political economy of population economics," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 255-257, June.

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