The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 1632.
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