In this paper we consider the design and implementation of a pay-as-you-go social insurance system as a problem in political economy. We consider whether a society of forward looking rational economic agents would implement a system in which the level of benefits can depend on the relative shares of different age groups in the population. We calibrate a model economy to match long-run features of the US economy and then look at the nature of the social security system that results.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Rochester, Business - General in its series Papers with number
96-01.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 1996 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:robuge:96-01
Contact details of provider: Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, CENTER FOR MANUFACTURING AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, WILLIAM E. SIMON GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, Email: Web page: http://www.simon.rochester.edu/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).
Find related papers by JEL classification: H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)