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Mixing Bismarck and Child Pension Systems: An Optimum Taxation Approach

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Author Info
Robert Fenge ()
Jakob von Weizsäcker ()

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Abstract

The labor-leisure distortion of a pay-as-you-go pension system can be reduced through a stronger tax-benefit link or Bismarck pension system. Distortions of the fertility decision can be reduced through the introduction of a stronger child-benefit or child pension system. Within our optimal taxation framework, we find a Corlett-Hague result regarding the optimal mix of the two: if and only if children are more complementary to leisure should the tax-benefit link be given a positive weight at the expense of the child-benefit link. The model also allows us to examine the infertility insurance argument that may justify redistribution from families with children to those without implied by most pension systems. We find that the opposite redistribution, from the childless to those with children, would be efficient if individuals have low risk aversion. Redistribution in favor of the infertile would only be justified when risk aversion is high.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 1751.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1751

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Related research
Keywords: pay-as-you-go pension; fertility; externality; Bismarck pension; optimal taxation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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  1. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2005. "Pensions and fertility incentives," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 28-48, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Atkinson, Anthony B & Stern, N H, 1974. "Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 119-28, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Alan J. Auerbach, 1986. "The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation," NBER Working Papers 1025, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Discussion Papers in Economics 938, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Robin Boadway & Pierre Pestieau, 2002. "Indirect Taxation and Redistribution: The Scope of the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem," Working Papers 1005, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Martin Kolmar, 1997. "Intergenerational redistribution in a small open economy with endogenous fertility," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 335-356. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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