AbstractThe autors study the implications of the trade-off between child quality and child quantity for the efficiency of the rate of population growth. They show that if quantity and quality are inversely related then, even in the case of full altruism within the family, population growth is inefficiently high, if the family does not have, or does not choose to use, compensating instruments (for example, bequests are at a corner). In non-altruistic models this trade-off certaibly generates a population problem. The authors therefore prove that the repugnant conclusion is not only repugnant, it may be inefficient. However, we cannot expect intra-family contracting to resolve the inefficiency since it involves contracts which are not credible.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 84 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
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