Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Endogenous fertility in a model with non-dynastic parental altruism

Contents:

Author Info

  • Robert Kollmann

    ()
    (UFR Sciences Economiques, UniversitÊ de Grenoble 2, BP 47, F-38040 Grenoble Cedex 9, France)

Abstract

A model of fertility choice is studied in which the utility of parents depends on how much they consume, on how many children they have and on the consumption of their children. Hence, parents are altruistic towards their children, but in a more limited sense than in the much discussed dynastic fertility model presented by Becker and Barro (1988). The concept of a (subgame perfect) bequest equilibrium is used to solve the non-dynastic model considered here. The steady state birth rate is lower in the non-dynastic model than in the Becker-Barro model. However, the key qualitative predictions concerning the dynamic behavior of fertility are strikingly similar in both models. JEL classification: J13, J11, D90.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/papers/7010001/70100087.pdf
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/papers/7010001/70100087.ps.gz
Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Population Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 87-95

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:10:y:1997:i:1:p:87-95

Note: Received August 17, 1995/Accepted October 20, 1996
Contact details of provider:
Phone: +43-70-2468-8236
Fax: +43-70-2468-8238
Email:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00148/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

Related research

Keywords: Fertility · consumption · bequest equilibrium · altruism · non-dynastic preferences.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Alessandro Cigno, 2005. "The Political Economy of Intergenerational Cooperation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1632, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Jason Shogren, 2002. "Valuing Indirect Effects From Environmental Hazards On A Child’s Life Chances," NCEE Working Paper Series 200209, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Sep 2002.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:10:y:1997:i:1:p:87-95. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.