Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Corporate Tax Policy, Foreign Firm Ownership and Thin Capitalization

Contents:

Author Info

  • Clemens Fuest
  • Thomas Hemmelgarn

Abstract

This paper analyzes the implications of foreign firm ownership and international profit shifting through thin capitalization for corporate tax policy. We consider a model of interjurisdictional tax competition where the corporate tax serves as a backstop to the personal income tax, interest on debt is deductible from the corporate tax base and multinational firms may shift profit across countries through thin capitalization. We show that the problem of thin capitalization induces countries to reduce their corporate tax rates below the personal income tax rate and to broaden their tax bases. Moreover, foreign firm ownership leads to a reduction in corporate tax rates. We also show that there is scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination in our model. In the presence of both foreign firm ownership and thin capitalization, countries gain from a coordinated increase in corporate tax rates or from a coordinated broadening of the tax base.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2003/wp-cesifo-2003-12/cesifo1_wp1096.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1096.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1096

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Email:
Web page: http://www.cesifo.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: tax competition; income shifting;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jack M. Mintz & Michael Smart, 2001. "Income Shifting, Investment, and Tax Competition: Theory and Evidence from Provincial Taxation in Canada," International Tax Program Papers 0402, International Tax Program, Institute for International Business, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, revised Apr 2003.
  2. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 1997. "Capital income and profit taxation with foreign ownership of firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 149-165, February.
  3. Harry Huizinga & Søren Bo Nielsen, . "The Coordination of Capital Income and Profit Taxation with Cross-Ownership of Firms," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 96-17, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Konrad, K.A. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Fortress Building in Global Tax Competition," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- 17/98, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 2002. "Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(5), pages 567-589, September.
  6. Richter, Wolfram F. & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1996. "The provision of local public goods and factors in the presence of firm and household mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 73-93, April.
  7. Fuest, Clemens, 2005. "Economic integration and tax policy with endogenous foreign firm ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1823-1840, September.
  8. Chowdhry, Bhagwan & Nanda, Vikram, 1994. "Financing of multinational subsidiaries: Parent debt vs. external debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 259-281, August.
  9. Olsen, Trond E. & Osmundsen, Petter, 2001. "Strategic tax competition; implications of national ownership," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-277, August.
  10. Haufler, Andreas & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2000. "Corporate Tax Systems and Cross Country Profit Shifting," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 306-25, April.
  11. Alfons Weichenrieder, 1996. "Anti-tax-avoidance provisions and the size of foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 67-81, January.
  12. Thomas A. Gresik, 2001. "The Taxing Task of Taxing Transnationals," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 800-838, September.
  13. Jack Mintz & Michael Smart, 1998. "Tax-exempt investors and the asset allocation puzzle," Working Papers msmart-98-04, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  14. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2002. "Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 20311, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  15. Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines, 2004. "A Multinational Perspective on Capital Structure Choice and Internal Capital Markets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(6), pages 2451-2487, December.
  16. Chowdhry, Bhagwan & Coval, Joshua D., 1998. "Internal financing of multinational subsidiaries: Debt vs. equity1," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 87-106, March.
  17. Osmundsen, P. & Hagen, K. P. & Schjelderup, G., 1998. "Internationally mobile firms and tax policy1," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-113, June.
  18. Wildasin, David E. & Wilson, John Douglas, 1998. "Risky local tax bases: risk-pooling vs. rent-capture," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 229-247, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1096. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.