Recessions and policy interventions in labour markets in developing countries arecharacterized not only by changes in the unemployment rate, but also by changes in theproportion of formal or protected jobs. This reallocation between formal and informal jobs islarge and occurs mainly because the job finding rate of formal jobs reacts substantially morethan the job finding rate of informal jobs. This paper presents a search and matching model tocapture this fact. I assume that firms operate the within firm margin of formality, choosing tolegalize only those matches that are good enough to compensate the costs of formality. In thisframework, recessions or stricter regulations in the labour market trigger two effects. Asexpected, they lower the incentives to post vacancies (meeting effect), but also affect thefirms' hiring standards, favouring informal contracts (offer effect). This new channel shedslight on how the actions of policy makers alter the outcomes in an economy with informaljobs. For instance, attempts to protect employment by increasing .ring costs will reallocateworkers to informal jobs, where job separation is high. They are also likely to increaseunemployment.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number
dp0761.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2005.
"Shadow Sorting,"
NBER Chapters,
in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2005
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002.
"The Regulation Of Entry,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
NBER Working Papers
7892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
Working Paper Series
rwp01-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]