Moral, The Informal Sector, and Unemployment
AbstractWhile examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number 2001:09.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, S-751 20 UPPSALA SWEDEN.
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
TAX EVASION ; WAGES ; MORAL ; UNEMPLOYMENT;
Other versions of this item:
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kolm, Ann-Sofie & Larsen, Birthe, 2001. "Moral Costs, The Informal Sector And Unemployment," Working Papers 01-2001, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Dominik H. Enste & Friedrich Schneider, 2000. "Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 77-114, March.
- Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002.
"Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration,"
Handbook of Public Economics,
in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470
- Luigi Bonaventura, 2011. "Enforcement of regulation, irregular sector, and firm performance: a computational agent-based model," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 99-113, July.
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