While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.
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Paper provided by Uppsala - Working Paper Series in its series Papers with number
2001:09.
Length: 13 pages Date of creation: 2001 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:uppaal:2001:09
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
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