Electricity Liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design
AbstractBritain was the exemplar of electricity market reform, demonstrating the importance of ownership unbundling and workable competition in generation and supply. Privatisation created de facto duopolies that supported increasing price-cost margins and induced excessive (English) entry. Concentration was ended by trading horizontal for vertical integration in subsequent mergers. Competition arrived just as the Pool was replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) intended to address its claimed shortcomings. NETA cost over £700 million, and had ambiguous market impacts. Prices fell dramatically as a result of (pre-NETA) competition, generating companies withdrew plant, causing fears about security of supply and a subsequent widening of price-cost margins.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0469.
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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electricity; liberalisation; market design; market power;
Other versions of this item:
- David M. Newbery, 2005. "Electricity liberalization in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 43-70.
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-12-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2004-12-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENE-2004-12-12 (Energy Economics)
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