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Electricity liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design

Author

Listed:
  • David Newbery

    (Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge,)

Abstract

Britain was the exemplar of electricity market reform, demonstrating the importance of ownership unbundling and workable competition in generation and supply. Privatisation created de facto duopolies that supported increasing price-cost margins and induced excessive (English) entry. Concentration was ended by trading horizontal for vertical integration in subsequent mergers. Competition arrived just as the Pool was replaced by New Electricity Trading Arrangements (NETA) intended to address its claimed shortcomings. NETA cost over £700 million, and had ambiguous market impacts. Prices fell dramatically as a result of (pre-NETA) competition, generating companies withdrew plant, causing fears about security of supply and a subsequent widening of price-cost margins.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David Newbery, 2004. "Electricity liberalisation in Britain: the quest for a satisfactory wholesale market design," Working Papers EP64, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:enp:wpaper:ep64
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Karolina Safarzyńska & Jeroen Bergh, 2013. "An evolutionary model of energy transitions with interactive innovation-selection dynamics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 271-293, April.
    2. Fabien Roques & David M. Newbery & William J. Nuttall, 2004. "Generation Adequacy and Investment Incentives in Britain: from the Pool to NETA," Working Papers EP58, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    3. Angenendt, Nicole & Growitsch, Christian & Nepal, Rabindra & Müller, Christine, 2008. "Effizienz und Stabilität des Stromgroßhandelsmarktes in Deutschland: Analyse und wirtschafts-politische Implikationen," WIK Discussion Papers 317, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    4. Triebs, Thomas P. & Pollitt, Michael G., 2019. "Objectives and incentives: Evidence from the privatization of Great Britain’s power plants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 1-29.
    5. Safarzynska, Karolina & van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M., 2011. "Industry evolution, rational agents and the transition to sustainable electricity production," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 6440-6452, October.
    6. Eva Niesten & Albert Jolink, 2014. "Absence of a market in the Dutch balancing mechanism: European rules versus specific investments," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 71-90, August.
    7. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
    8. Hernandez Martinez, Fernando, 2006. "La producción de energía eléctrica en España: Análisis económico de la actividad tras la liberalización del Sector Eléctrico [Electricity output in Spain: Economic analysis of the activity after liberalization]," MPRA Paper 18050, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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