Wages and International Tax Competition
Abstract
Firms generating larger surpluses on average pay higher wages. We study the effect of this rent-sharing between firms and workers on international tax competition. In our model, firms in a large country can shift surplus to a tax haven. In the benchmark case firms only have a tax incentive for profit shifting as shifted surplus is fully taken into account in the wage bargaining. In this case rent-sharing decreases the competitive pressure on the large country and leads to higher equilibrium tax rates. When workers do not observe the full surplus shifted, a wage incentive arises. Profit shifting then becomes more attractive as it reduces the surplus bargained over with workers. If this effect is sufficiently strong, rent-sharing increases the competitive pressure on the large country, which implies a lower equilibrium tax rate.Download Info
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Paper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number 1123.Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:1123
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Keywords: wages; tax competition; rent-sharing; profit shifting; tax havens;Other versions of this item:
- Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2012. "Wages and International Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3867, CESifo Group Munich.
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Dwenger, Nadja & Rattenhuber, Pia & Steiner, Viktor, 2011.
"Sharing the burden: Empirical evidence on corporate tax incidence,"
Discussion Papers
2011/19, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
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