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Coordination of Humanitarian Aid

Author

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  • Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka
  • In-Uck Park

Abstract

We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget of humanitarian aid between two equally needy areas. The agents may be biased to one area which is their private information. Without communication aid is allocated inefficiently resulting in gaps and overlaps in response. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure. We show that coordination can be improved by a mediator, such as an information management system, which filters the information communicated by the agents. Our results can throw light on how to improve the current disaster management systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & In-Uck Park, 2017. "Coordination of Humanitarian Aid," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 17/691, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Handle: RePEc:bri:uobdis:17/691
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    File URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/efm/media/workingpapers/working_papers/pdffiles/dp17691.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee & Alice H. Amsden & Robert H. Bates & Jagdish Bhagwati & Angus Deaton & Nicholas Stern, 2007. "Making Aid Work," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262026155, December.
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    3. Jayne, Thomas S. & Strauss, John & Yamano, Takashi & Molla, Daniel, 2002. "Targeting of food aid in rural Ethiopia: chronic need or inertia?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 247-288, August.
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    5. Nezih Altay & Raktim Pal, 2014. "Information Diffusion among Agents: Implications for Humanitarian Operations," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 23(6), pages 1015-1027, June.
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    7. Jayne, T. S. & Strauss, John & Yamano, Takashi & Molla, Daniel, 2001. "Giving to the Poor? Targeting of Food Aid in Rural Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 887-910, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coordination; humanitarian aid; public goods; cheap talk; mediated communication; information management system.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H84 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Disaster Aid
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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