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A strategic mediator who is biased into the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

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Author Info

  • Lydia Mechtenberg
  • Johannes Münster

Abstract

This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a dis- crete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communica- tion, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication.

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File URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2011-012.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2011-012.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2011-012

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Keywords: Communication; Information; Cheap talk; Mediation;

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References

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  1. Till Strohsal & Enzo Weber, 2011. "Mean-Variance Cointegration and the Expectations Hypothesis," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  3. Ivanov, Maxim, 2010. "Communication via a strategic mediator," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 869-884, March.
  4. Li, Ming & Madarász, Kristóf, 2008. "When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 47-74, March.
  5. Wolfgang Karl Härdle & Brenda López Cabrera & Ostap Okhrin & Weining Wang, 2011. "Localising temperature risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-001, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  6. Shuzhuan Zheng & Lijian Yang & Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 2011. "A Confidence Corridor for Sparse Longitudinal Data Curves," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-002, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  7. Esra Akdeniz Duran & Mengmeng Guo & Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 2011. "A Confidence Corridor for Expectile Functions," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-004, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  8. Wolfgang Karl Härdle & Vladimir Spokoiny & Weining Wang, 2011. "Local Quantile Regression," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-005, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  9. Lu Lin & Feng Li & Lixing Zhu & Wolfgang Karl Härdle, 2011. "Mean Volatility Regressions," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2011-003, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  10. Goltsman, Maria & Hörner, Johannes & Pavlov, Gregory & Squintani, Francesco, 2009. "Mediation, arbitration and negotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1397-1420, July.
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