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The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers

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  • S. Baldelli
  • L. Lambertini

Abstract

We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot duopoly where firms adopt a concave cost-reducing R&D technology. Cooperation, in the form of either a cartel or a joint venture, is always profitable for firms and, contrary to the previous literature on the same topic, (i) no corner solutions emerge and (ii) R&D cooperation is socially superior to independent ventures for any spillover level, provided the cost of R&D financing is sufficiently high.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 510.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:510

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  14. Luca Lambertini & Dan Sasaki, 1999. "Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 69(2), pages 173-188, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2014. "Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2014.35, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Yasunori Ouchida & Daisaku Goto, 2014. "Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator’s precommitment to an emissions tax," IDEC DP2 Series 4-3, Hiroshima University, Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC).

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