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Non-Negative Quantity Constraints and the Duration of Punishment

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Author Info
Lambertini, L.
Sasaki, D.

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Abstract

In an oligopoly supergame, firms face an obvious technological constraint: the positivity of their production quantities. WE show that Lambson's (1987) result on "security-level punishment", that the single-period punishment makes the firm's discounted participation condition just bind, holds only in a Bertrand supergame with perfect substitutes. In general, the sustainability of collusion by means of single-period penal codes hinges critically upon the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, as well as upon the positivity constraints on prices and/or quantities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The University of Melbourne in its series Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number 630.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 1998
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Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:630

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Postal: Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne, 5th Floor, Economics and Commerce Building, Victoria, 3010, Australia
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Related research
Keywords: GAMES ; OLIGOPOLIES ; PENAL SANCTIONS;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. De Villemeur, Étienne & Flochel, Laurent & Versaevel, Bruno, 2009. "Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint," IDEI Working Papers 547, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Robert Gagné & Simon van Norden & Bruno Versaevel, 2003. "Testing Optimal Punishment Mechanisms Under Price Regulation: the Case of the Retail Market for Gasoline," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-57, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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