Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.
Volume (Year): 60 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941
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