Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Collusion in differentiated duopolies revisited

Contents:

Author Info

  • Albaek, Svend
  • Lambertini, Luca

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-3T3RX42-5/2/b1d33851f5a555ed644b51645a8edaef
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 59 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 305-308

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:59:y:1998:i:3:p:305-308

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rothschild, R., 1992. "On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 33-37, September.
  2. Deneckere, R., 1983. "Duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-42.
  3. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  4. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Lambertini, L. & Sasaki, D., 1999. "A Cost-Side Analysis on Collusive Sustainability," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 710, The University of Melbourne.
  2. Posada, P., 2001. "Leadership Cartels in Industries with Differentiated Products," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 590, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  3. Osterdal, Lars Peter, 2003. "A note on the stability of collusion in differentiated oligopolies," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 53-64, March.
  4. Lambertini, Luca & Trombetta, Marco, 2002. "Delegation and firms' ability to collude," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 359-373, April.
  5. Colombo, Stefano, 2010. "Product differentiation, price discrimination and collusion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 18-27, March.
  6. Luca Lambertini & Christian Schultz, 2001. "Price or Quantity in Tacit Collusion?," CIE Discussion Papers 2001-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
  7. David Collie, 2004. "Collusion and the elasticity of demand," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-6.
  8. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2009. "Does cartel leadership facilitate collusion?," DEA Working Papers 39, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
  9. Stefano Colombo, 2013. "Differentiated Bertrand markets: restoring the minimum differentiation principle," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 103-108, July.
  10. Shimizu, Daisuke, 2002. "Product differentiation in spatial Cournot markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 317-322, August.
  11. Akinbosoye, Osayi & Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2012. "On the stability of multimarket collusion in price-setting supergames," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 253-264.
  12. Poddar, Sougata & Sasaki, Dan, 2002. "The strategic benefit from advance production," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 579-595, September.
  13. Luca Lambertini, 2000. "Technology and Cartel Stability under Vertical Differentiation," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(4), pages 421-442, November.
  14. Panos Kanavos & Joan Costa Font & Alistair McGuire, 2007. "Product differentiation, competition and regulation of new drugs: the case of statins in four European countries," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4-5), pages 455-465.
  15. Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
  16. Lambertini, Luca & Poddar, Sougata & Sasaki, Dan, 2002. "Research joint ventures, product differentiation, and price collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 829-854, June.
  17. Baldelli, Serena & Lambertini, Luca, 2006. "Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 121-130, September.
  18. Sougata Poddar & Bibhas Saha, 2010. "Product Innovation and Stability of Collusion," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(2), pages 1392-1400.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:59:y:1998:i:3:p:305-308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.