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Sustaining Collusion When the Choice of Strategic Variable is Endogenous

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  • R.Rothschild

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Lancaster in its series Working Papers with number ec3/93.

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Handle: RePEc:wuk:lanedp:ec3/93

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Postal: Department of Economics The Management School Lancaster University Lancaster LA1 4YX UK
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Web page: http://www.lums.lancs.ac.uk/econ/wkpap.htm
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  1. Leonard Cheng, 1985. "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria: A Geometric Approach," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 146-152, Spring.
  2. Rothschild, R., 1992. "On the sustainability of collusion in differentiated duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 33-37, September.
  3. Deneckere, R., 1983. "Duopoly supergames with product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-2), pages 37-42.
  4. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
  5. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
  6. Hathaway, Neville J. & Rickard, John A., 1979. "Equilibria of price-setting and quantity-setting duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 133-137.
  7. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  8. Ross, Thomas W., 1992. "Cartel stability and product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, March.
  9. Rothschild, R, 1985. "Noncooperative Behaviour as a Credible Threat," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(3), pages 245-48, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Donghun Kim, 2006. "Measuring Market Power in a Dynamic Oligopoly Model: The Dallas-Forth Worth Milk Market Case," Working Papers EMS_2006_06, Research Institute, International University of Japan.
  2. S. Baldelli & L. Lambertini, 2004. "The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technology and spillovers," Working Papers 510, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  3. Baldelli, Serena & Lambertini, Luca, 2006. "Price vs quantity in a duopoly supergame with Nash punishments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 121-130, September.

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