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Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms

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L. Lambertini

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Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 296.

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Date of creation: Jun 1997
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Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:296

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Luca Lambertini, 1995. "Cournot Vs Stackelberg Equilibria With Entrepreneurial and Labour Managed Firms," Working Papers 217, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  4. Luca Lambertini, 1997. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Discussion Papers 97-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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  5. Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1982. "Price Leadership: A Theoretical Analysis," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 49(193), pages 11-20, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Lambertini, Luca & Trombetta, Marco, 2002. "Delegation and firms' ability to collude," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 359-373, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Steve Dowrick, 1986. "von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(2), pages 251-260, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Basu, Kaushik, 1995. "Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: An explanation based on managerial incentives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 459-464, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "First Mover and Second Mover Advantages," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 649-53, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Robson, Arthur J, 1990. "Duopoly with Endogenous Strategic Timing: Stackelberg Regained," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(2), pages 263-74, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Boyer, Marcel & Moreaux, Michel, 1987. "On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: The Critical Role of the Strategy Space," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(2), pages 217-30, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1983. "Strategic Commitment with R&D: The Symmetric Case," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 225-235, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Yasuhiko Nakamura & Tomohiro Inoue, 2007. "Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: The Managerial Delegation Case," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(27), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  2. Orlando I. Balboa & Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2001. "Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade," Working Papers 0112, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Dec 2002. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Luca Lambertini, 1996. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Working Papers 267, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. L. Lambertini & M. Trombetta, 1997. "May Delegation Affect Firms' Ability to Collude?," Working Papers 275, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  5. L. Lambertini & G. Primavera, 2000. "Delegation vs Cost-Reducing R&D in a Cournot Duopoly," Working Papers 377, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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