Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks
AbstractThis paper proposes a model of voting competitions (political campaigns and strategic lobbying) where voters are influenced by the opinion of their neighbors on a social network. In the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium, resources are targeted toward individuals with an influential position in the network. This finding contrasts with previous theories of strategic spending which predict that parties (or lobbies) should spend more on individuals who have a higher probability of being pivotal for the vote. The paper then tests the model using data on campaign contributions by interests groups in the US. House of Representatives. The estimations show that both network influence and pivotality are significant predictors of campaign contributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banco de México in its series Working Papers with number 2010-16.
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision:
Network games; strategic spending; Colonel Blotto games; counteractive lobbying; Bonacich centrality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-03 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2011-01-03 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-01-03 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-01-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-URE-2011-01-03 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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