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Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

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Author Info

  • Fernando Broner

    (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE)

  • Alberto Martin

    (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE)

  • Jaume Ventura

    (CREI, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE)

  • Aitor Erce

    (Banco de España and European stability mechanism)

Abstract

In 2007, countries in the euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recession, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private to the public sector, reducing investment and deepening the recession even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowing is limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productive investment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countries in the euro zone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Banco de Espa�a in its series Banco de Espa�a Working Papers with number 1402.

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Length: 69 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2014
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bde:wpaper:1402

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Keywords: sovereign debt; discrimination; crowding out; rollover crises; economic growth;

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References

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  1. Jaume Ventura & Fernando A. Broner, 2006. "Globalization and Risk Sharing," NBER Working Papers 12482, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Alexander Guembel & Oren Sussman, 2009. "Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1297-1320.
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Cited by:
  1. Camille Cornand & Pauline Gandré & Céline Gimet, 2014. "Increase in Home Bias and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers 1419, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  2. Paolo Angelini & Giuseppe Grande & Fabio Panetta, 2014. "The negative feedback loop between banks and sovereigns," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 213, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Harald Uhlig, 2013. "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union," NBER Working Papers 19343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Serkan Arslanalp & Takahiro Tsuda, 2014. "Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt," IMF Working Papers 14/39, International Monetary Fund.
  5. Hale, Galina & Obstfeld, Maurice, 2014. "The euro and the geography of international debt flows," Working Paper Series 2014-10, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  6. Filippo Brutti & Philip Ulrich Sauré, 2014. "Repatriation of Debt in the Euro Crisis: Evidence for the Secondary Market Theory," Working Papers 2014-03, Swiss National Bank.
  7. Camille Cornand & Pauline Gandré & Céline Gimet, 2014. "Increase in Home Bias and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis," Working Papers halshs-01015475, HAL.

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