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Contract Enforcement, Institutional Stability, and the Level and Maturity of International Debt

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Abstract

Contract enforcement and institutional stability play an important role in determining the level and maturity of international debt. Contract enforcement is modeled as a fixed cost that investors incur to obtain the contracted, gross returns on international investments. Institutional stability is modeled as the probability that the same contract enforcement cost will persist over time. Countries with poor contract enforcement and institutionally unstable impose higher contract enforcement costs and increase uncertainty about their structure. The level and maturity of international debt is reduced as a result. The empirical estimation provides support for the hypothesis. Stronger contract enforcement and institutional stability increase international lending and lengthen its maturity.

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File URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/icepp/wp/ispwp0617.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0617.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0617

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Web page: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/index.html

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Keywords: Contract enforcement; Institutions; Stability; International Lending; Maturity;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Wasseem Mina, 2013. "Beyond FDI: The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Debt," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1325, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
  2. Mina, Wasseem Michel, 2011. "Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to MENA Region: Does One .Best. Fit All?," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  3. Mina, Wasseem, 2013. "Political Risk Guarantees and Capital Flows: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties," MPRA Paper 51811, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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