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Does contract enforcement matter for international lending?

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  • Wasseem Mina

Abstract

Contract enforcement plays an important role in international lending. The hypotheses that better contract enforcement increases the level and lengthens the maturity of international debt are examined. Panel data are used for 83 developing and emerging market economies for the period 1982-1997 to examine these hypotheses. The empirical evidence supports these hypotheses.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 13 (2006)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 359-364

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Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:13:y:2006:i:6:p:359-364

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Cited by:
  1. Mina, Wasseem, 2012. "Beyond FDI: The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Debt," MPRA Paper 51920, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Mina, Wasseem Michel, 2012. "The Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to the MENA Region: The “Best” Ensemble," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1798-1809.
  3. Mina, Wasseem Michel, 2011. "Institutional Reforms Debate and FDI Flows to MENA Region: Does One .Best. Fit All?," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  4. Mina, Wasseem, 2013. "Political Risk Guarantees and Capital Flows: The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties," MPRA Paper 51811, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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