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How Democracy Matters: Evidence of Electoral Incentives for Environmental Policy

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  • Joungseok Park

Abstract

I test the theoretical predictions from Park (2016) that the right-wing politicians will distort environmental policy to avoid losing the election. I study how the population environmental preferences, as measured by the LCV scores, influence state governors to become more concerned about the environment. From a U.S. panel data in the period of 1971-2007, I find the Republican state governors increase the environmental expenditure per capita by approximately 1.5 percent as the Democrat LCV scores increase by 1 percent; and they increase the environmental expenditure per capita by 4.8 percent as the Republican LCV scores decrease by 1 percent. That is, Republican governors respond positively to the environmental preferences of Democrats, but not to that of Republicans. Key Words: Democracy; Environmental Policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Joungseok Park, 2016. "How Democracy Matters: Evidence of Electoral Incentives for Environmental Policy," Working Papers 16-20, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:16-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    democracy; environmental policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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