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Contract Design for Biodiversity Procurement

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Author Info
Bardsley, Peter
Burfurd, Ingrid
Abstract

Market based instruments are proving increasingly effective in biodiversity procurement and in regulatory schemes to preserve biodiversity. The design of these policy instruments brings together issues in auction design, contract theory, biology, and monitoring technology. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design may differ significantly between procurement and regulatory policy environments.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in its series 2009 Conference (53rd), February 11-13, 2009, Cairns, Australia with number 48047.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aare09:48047

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Keywords: biodiversity; procurement; adverse selection; moral hazard; contract theory;

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    Other versions:
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  6. Gorddard, Russell & Whitten, Stuart & Reeson, Andrew, 2008. "When should biodiversity tenders contract on outcomes?," 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia 5979, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-26.

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