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Optimal Compensation For Endangered Species Protection Under Asymmetric Information

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  • Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane
  • McKitrick, Ross
  • Rollins, Kimberly S.

Abstract

This paper argues that policies based on economic instruments are preferable to command and control approaches for effectively protecting biological diversity. This is due to sources of inefficiencies because of informational asymmetries between the regulator and private land users. We propose a principal agent framework to design optimally structured and performance based economic incentives for private land owners.

Suggested Citation

  • Huennemeyer, Anne-Juliane & McKitrick, Ross & Rollins, Kimberly S., 1999. "Optimal Compensation For Endangered Species Protection Under Asymmetric Information," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21693, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21693
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21693
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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