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Do Safety Inspections Improve Safety? Evidence from the Safety Inspection Program for Commercial Motor Vehicles

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  • Liang, Yuanning

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  • Liang, Yuanning, 2020. "Do Safety Inspections Improve Safety? Evidence from the Safety Inspection Program for Commercial Motor Vehicles," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304312, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea20:304312
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.304312
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    Resource/Energy Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics;

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