Tariff Escalation And The Developing Countries: How Can Market Access Be Improved In The Doha Round Of Trade Negotiations?
AbstractThis paper explores the issue of market access where some developing countries export high-value processed goods and others export raw commodities. The results show that market access issues for goods entering at different stages of the marketing chain should take into consideration the potential existence of successively oligopolistic markets.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2004 Annual meeting, August 1-4, Denver, CO with number 20156.
Date of creation: 2004
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