An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
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- Werner Güth & Paul Pezanis-Christou, 2021. "An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(1), pages 63-74, March.
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Cited by:
- Paul Pezanis-Christou & Hang Wu, 2018. "A non-game-theoretic approach to bidding in first-price and all-pay auctions," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2018-12, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2018-08-20 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2018-08-20 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2018-08-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2018-08-20 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
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