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Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses

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Author Info
María-Angeles de Frutos
Thomas Kittsteiner

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Abstract

Buy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy-sell clauses result in an ex post efficient outcome. Such endogenous selection is consistent with how buy-sell clauses are drafted in practice. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00009.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 184-198
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Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:39:y:2008:i:1:p:184-198

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. de Frutos, M. Angeles, 2000. "Asymmetric Price-Benefits Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 48-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Ady Pauzner, 2006. "Partnership Dissolution with Interdependent Values," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
  4. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Reinhilde Veugelers & Katrien Kesteloot, 1996. "Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 23-51, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. HEGE, Ulrich & HAUSWALD, Robert, 2002. "Ownership and control in joint ventures: theory and evidence," Les Cahiers de Recherche 750, HEC Paris. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2003. "Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 54-76, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Benny Moldovanu, 2002. "How to Dissolve a Partnership," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(1), pages 66-, March.
  10. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1994. "Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 339-346, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Preston McAfee, R., 1992. "Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 266-293, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Li, Jianpei, 2009. "Partnership Dissolution and Proprietary Information," MPRA Paper 12505, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jianpei Li & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2004. "Partnership Dissolution, Complementarity, and Investment Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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