Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses
AbstractBuy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy-sell clauses result in an ex post efficient outcome. Such endogenous selection is consistent with how buy-sell clauses are drafted in practice. Copyright (c)2008, RAND.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by RAND Corporation in its journal The RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 39 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- María Angeles de Frutos & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2006. "Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses," Economics Working Papers we072816, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Maria Angeles de Frutos & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2004. "Efficient partnership dissolution under buy/sell clauses," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse1_2004, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Jul 2004.
- Kittsteiner, T. & De Frutos & M-A, 2004. "Efficient Partnership Dissolution under Buy/Sell Clauses," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 314, Econometric Society.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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