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Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803

In: The Financing of Catastrophe Risk

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  • David Moss

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  • David Moss, 1999. "Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy since 1803," NBER Chapters, in: The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, pages 307-362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:7954
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.
    2. Sara Borden & Asani Sarkar, 1996. "Securitizing property catastrophe risk," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 2(Aug).
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven Shavell, 2014. "A general rationale for a governmental role in the relief of large risks," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 213-234, December.
    2. J. David Cummins & Michael Suher & George Zanjani, 1975. "Federal Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk, pages 61-92, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Steven Shavell, 2014. "A General Rationale for a Governmental Role in the Relief of Large Risks," NBER Working Papers 20192, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Barker, David, 2003. "Terrorism insurance subsidies and social welfare," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 328-338, September.
    5. Howard II., James P., 2012. "Measuring the impacts of the national flood insurance program," MPRA Paper 37758, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Arnold N. Scott, 2000. "The Role of Government in Responding to Natural Catastrophes," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-24, December.
    7. Nathalie de Marcelis-Warin & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2003. "Catastrophe risk sharing and public-private partnerships : From natural disasters to terrorism," Working Papers hal-00242981, HAL.
    8. Atreya, Ajita & Ferreira, Susana, 2013. "An Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program in Georgia," 2013 Annual Meeting, February 2-5, 2013, Orlando, Florida 143046, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    9. Arnold N. Scott, 2000. "The Role Of Government In Responding To Natural Catastrophes," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-22, December.
    10. Michel-Kerjan Erwann & de Marcellis-Warin Nathalie, 2006. "Public-Private Programs for Covering Extreme Events: The Impact of Information Distribution on Risk-Sharing," Asia-Pacific Journal of Risk and Insurance, De Gruyter, vol. 1(2), pages 1-30, February.

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