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Branch Banking, Bank Competition, and Financial Stability

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Author Info
Mark Carlson
Kris James Mitchener
Abstract

It is often argued that branching stabilizes banking systems by facilitating diversification of bank portfolios; however, previous empirical research on the Great Depression offers mixed support for this view. Analyses using state-level data find that states allowing branch banking had lower failure rates, while those examining individual banks find that branch banks were more likely to fail. We argue that an alternative hypothesis can reconcile these seemingly disparate findings. Using data on national banks from the 1920s and 1930s, we show that branch banking increases competition and forces weak banks to exit the banking system. This consolidation strengthens the system as a whole without necessarily strengthening the branch banks themselves. Our empirical results suggest that the effects that branching had on competition were quantitatively more important than geographical diversification for bank stability in the 1920s and 1930s.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11291.

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Date of creation: May 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11291

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," NBER Working Papers 7582, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Donald Morgan & Bertrand Rime & Philip Strahan, 2003. "Bank Integration and State Business Cycles," NBER Working Papers 9704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1998. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions," NBER Working Papers 6637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Berger, Allen N. & Demsetz, Rebecca S. & Strahan, Philip E., 1999. "The consolidation of the financial services industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(2-4), pages 135-194, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kris James Mitchener, 2004. "Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Instability During the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 10475, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  7. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Matutes, Carmen & Vives, Xavier, 2000. "Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-34, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, 2000. "Causes of U.S. Bank Distress During the Depression," NBER Working Papers 7919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Randall S. Kroszner, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 158, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State. [Downloadable!]
  11. Koskela, Erkki & Stenbacka, Rune, 2000. "Is there a tradeoff between bank competition and financial fragility?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(12), pages 1853-1873, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Allen N. Berger & Timothy H. Hannan, 1998. "The Efficiency Cost Of Market Power In The Banking Industry: A Test Of The "Quiet Life" And Related Hypotheses," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 454-465, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Claessens, Stijn & Demirguc-Kunt, Asl[iota] & Huizinga, Harry, 2001. "How does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 891-911, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Demsetz, Rebecca S & Strahan, Philip E, 1997. "Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 300-313, August.
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  16. David C. Wheelock, 1995. "Regulation, market structure and the bank failures of the Great Depression," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Mar, pages 27-38. [Downloadable!]
  17. Jayaratne, Jith & Strahan, Philip E, 1998. "Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 239-73, April.
  18. Mark Carlson, 2004. "Are Branch Banks Better Survivors? Evidence from the Depression Era," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 111-126, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Economides, Nicholas & Hubbard, R Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1996. "The Political Economy of Branching Restrictions and Deposit Insurance: A Model of Monopolistic Competition among Small and Large Banks," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 667-704, October.
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  20. Wheelock, David C & Wilson, Paul W, 1995. "Explaining Bank Failures: Deposit Insurance, Regulation, and Efficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 77(4), pages 689-700, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. DeYoung, Robert & Hasan, Iftekhar & Kirchhoff, Bruce, 1998. "The Impact of Out-of-State Entry on the Cost Efficiency of Local Commercial Banks," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 191-203, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Allen N. Berger & Anil K. Kashyap & Joseph Scalise, 1995. "The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 96-06, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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  23. Kaminsky, Graciela Laura & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2002. "Short-run pain, long-run gain : the effects of financial liberalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2912, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  1. Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2006. "Effects of a bank consolidation promotion policy: Evaluating Bank Law in 1927 Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-400, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
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