Interest Groups and the Glass-Steagall Act
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich in its journal DICE.
Volume (Year): 11 (2014)
Issue (Month): 4 (01)
Finanzmarktregulierung; Bankenregulierung; Interessenvertretung; Geschichte; Vereinigte Staaten;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
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