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Global Governance of Global Monetary Relations: Rationale and Feasibility

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Author Info
Frieden, Jeffry A.

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Abstract

Is there a valid argument for international cooperation, and some form of international governance structure, in the international monetary realm? On the purely economic front, the argument is not strong. Yet a broader political economy approach concludes that national currency policy can in fact impose non-pecuniary externalities on partner nations. This is especially the case with major policy-driven misalignments, which cannot easily be countered by other governments. For example, one country's substantially depreciated currency can provoke powerful protectionist pressures in its trading partners, so that exchange rate policy spills over into trade policy in potentially damaging ways. Inasmuch as one government's policies create these sorts of costs for other countries, and for the world economy as a whole, there is a case for global governance. This might include some institutionalized mechanism to monitor and publicize substantial currency misalignments. While there appears to be little global political attention to such a mechanism now, there have been initiatives along these lines at the regional level, and the current crisis may have stimulated more general stirrings of interest.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its journal Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal.

Volume (Year): 3 (2009)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1-13
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:7550

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Related research
Keywords: International policy coordination and transmission; international institutional arrangements; international fiscal issues;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F55 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, August. [Downloadable!]
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  2. J. Ernesto López-Córdova & Christopher M. Meissner, 2003. "Exchange-Rate Regimes and International Trade: Evidence from the Classical Gold Standard Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 344-353, March. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Rose, Andrew K, 1999. "One Money, One Market: Estimating the Effect of Common Currencies on Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 2329, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. McKinnon, Ronald & Schnabl, Gunther, 2006. "Devaluing the dollar: A critical analysis of William Cline's case for a New Plaza Agreement," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 683-694, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Klein, Michael W. & Lewis, Karen K., 1993. "Learning about intervention target zones," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3-4), pages 275-295, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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