Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Leistungs- oder Bedarfsgerechtigkeit? Über einen normativen Zielkonflikt des Wohlfahrtsstaats und seiner Bedeutung für die Bewertung des eigenen Erwerbseinkommens


Author Info

  • Liebig, Stefan
  • Schupp, Jürgen


Der Beitrag analysiert den Zielkonflikt zwischen Leistungs- und Bedarfsgerechtigkeit in modernen Wohlfahrtsstaaten und das fundamentale Problem, weshalb die Abgabenund Steuerlast von den Bürgern akzeptiert wird. Es wird die Frage beantwortet, inwieweit ein auf der Makroebene der Gesellschaft bestehendes Steuerungsproblem moderner Wohlfahrtsstaaten auch in der individuellen Wahrnehmung Gerechtigkeitsprobleme erzeugt. Anhand von repräsentativen Befragungsergebnissen eines theoriegeleiteten Erhebungsmoduls der Längsschnittstudie Sozio- oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) aus den Jahren 2005 und 2007 wird untersucht, wie Erwerbstätige ihr Einkommen unter dem Aspekt der Lohngerechtigkeit bewerten und welche Bedeutung dabei wohlfahrtsstaatliche Eingriffe haben. Ein zentrales Ergebnis der Analysen stellt der vergleichsweise hohe Anteil derjenigen dar, die ihr Erwerbseinkommen als gerecht wahrnehmen. Der in der Literatur für die Makroebene der Gesellschaft konstatierte normative Zielkonflikt zwischen Leistungs- und Bedarfsgerechtigkeit scheint auf der individuellen Ebene nicht wirklich zu bestehen, wie der Beitrag sowohl theoretisch als auch empirisch zu zeigen versucht. Ein bedeutsames empirisches Ergebnis ist, dass das subjektive Empfinden gerechter Entlohnung nicht geschmälert wird durch die Abgabenbelastung des eigenen Einkommens. Auch Bezieher hoher Einkommen beurteilen ihre Einkommen keineswegs als ungerecht. Ein weiteres Ergebnis der Analysen besteht darin, dass Transferzahlungen des Staates die individuellen Ungerechtigkeitsempfindungen im Hinblick auf das eigene Einkommen nicht kompensieren können; offen erkennbare Transferzahlungen werden von den erwerbstätigen Empfängern möglicherweise als diskriminierend empfunden. -- The article analyzes the conflict of social justice norms within modem welfare states - the guarantee of just compensation for individual efforts and the provision of support based on individual need - in order to answer the fundamental question of why citizens accept the financial burden of welfare states. We ask if modem welfare states' governance problems at the macrosocial level lead to perceptions of injustice at the individual level. Based on representative data from a theory-driven supplemental survey to the longitudinal German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) study, we investigate how employed persons evaluate the fairness of their own earnings and the effects of welfare state interventions. An important finding is the high percentage of employed persons in Germany who considered their income to be fair. The article shows - both empirically and theoretically - that the normative conflict between effort and need based concepts of justice posited in the literature at the macrosocial level does not exist at the individual level. An important empirical result is that the subjective perception of being paid fairly is not decreased by a higher tax burden on individual income. Furthermore, high-income earners by no means perceive their income as unjust. A further important result of the analysis is the finding that government transfers do not have a moderating effect on perceived injustice of personal income; openly recognizable transfer payments may even be perceived as discriminatory.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ZBW - German National Library of Economics in its journal EconStor Open Access Articles.

Volume (Year): (2008)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 7-30

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:73857

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Düsternbrooker Weg 120, 24105 Kiel / Neuer Jungfernstieg 21, 20354 Hamburg
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 8814-520
Web page:
More information through EDIRC

Related research



References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S251-78, October.
  2. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February.
  3. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October.
  4. Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 2002. "Maintenance of and Innovation in Long-Term Panel Studies: The Case of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 276, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  5. Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 2005. "Gerechtigkeit der Einkommensbesteuerung aus Sicht der Bürger," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(29), pages 451-453.
  6. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
  7. Akerlof, George A, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-69, November.
  8. Achatz, Juliane & Gartner, Hermann & Glück, Timea, 2004. "Bonus oder Bias? Mechanismen geschlechtsspezifischer Entlohnung," IAB Discussion Paper 200402, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
  9. Siegrist, Johannes & Starke, Dagmar & Chandola, Tarani & Godin, Isabelle & Marmot, Michael & Niedhammer, Isabelle & Peter, Richard, 2004. "The measurement of effort-reward imbalance at work: European comparisons," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 58(8), pages 1483-1499, April.
  10. Fong, Christina M. & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2006. "Strong reciprocity and the welfare state," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
  11. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number minc74-1.
  12. van Vegchel, Natasja & de Jonge, Jan & Bosma, Hans & Schaufeli, Wilmar, 2005. "Reviewing the effort-reward imbalance model: drawing up the balance of 45 empirical studies," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 60(5), pages 1117-1131, March.
  13. Stefan Svallfors, 2003. "Welfare Regimes and Welfare Opinions: a Comparison of Eight Western Countries," Social Indicators Research, Springer, vol. 64(3), pages 495-520, December.
  14. Dornstein, Miriam, 1987. "Taxes: Attitudes and perceptions and their social bases," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 55-76, March.
  15. Cohen-Charash, Yochi & Spector, Paul E., 2001. "The Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 278-321, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)



This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:73857. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.