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The effect of employment and training programs on entry and exit from the welfare caseload

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Author Info

  • Robert A. Moffitt

    (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland)

Abstract

To policymakers, the major attraction of employment and training programs for welfare recipients is that they hold out the prospect that recipients can be moved off the rolls and to self-sufficiency in the private labor market, thereby decreasing welfare costs and caseloads. This article considers the possibility that such programs may also affect the attractiveness of welfare in the first place, either by making welfare less desirable because the work-training program is viewed by recipients as a burden, or by making it more desirable because the program is viewed favorably by potential applicants. Such responses are termed here “entry rate effects.” Some empirical estimates are presented which suggest that the magnitude of such entry rate effects on the caseload, where positive or negative, may be quite large.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

Volume (Year): 15 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 32-50

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Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:15:y:1996:i:1:p:32-50

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/34787/home

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References

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  1. Ashenfelter, Orley C, 1978. "Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(1), pages 47-57, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Robert A. Moffitt & David Stevens, 2001. "Changing Caseloads: Macro Influences and Micro Composition," JCPR Working Papers 218, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  2. T. Kaplan, . "Wisconsin’s W-2 Program: Welfare as We Might Come to Know It," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1173-98, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  3. L. M. Mead, . "Are welfare employment programs effective?," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1096-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  4. Blank, Rebecca M. & Card, David & Robins, Philip K., 1999. "Financial Incentives for Increasing Work and Income Among Low-Income Families," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2f15x7sg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. David Card & Dean R. Hyslop, 2006. "The Dynamic Effects of an Earnings Subsidy for Long-Term Welfare Recipients: Evidence from the SSP Applicant Experiment," NBER Working Papers 12774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. L. M. Mead, . "The Decline of Welfare in Wisconsin," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1164-98, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  7. Robert Moffitt, 2002. "The role of randomized field trials in social science research: a perspective from evaluations of reforms of social welfare programs," CeMMAP working papers CWP23/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  8. Fortin, Bernard, 1997. "Dépendance à l’égard de l’aide sociale et réforme de la sécurité du revenu," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 73(4), pages 557-573, décembre.
  9. J. P. Ziliak & D. N. Figlio & E. E. Davis & L. S. Connolly, . "Accounting for the Decline in AFDC Caseloads: Welfare Reform or Economic Growth?," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1151-97, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  10. Charles Michalopoulos & Philip K. Robins & David Card, 2000. "When Financial Incentives Pay for Themselves: Early Findings from the Self-Sufficiency Project's Applicant Study," JCPR Working Papers 133, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
  11. Lawrence M. Mead, 1996. "Welfare policy: The administrative frontier," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(4), pages 587-600.
  12. Michalopoulos, Charles & Robins, Philip K. & Card, David, 2005. "When financial work incentives pay for themselves: evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 5-29, January.
  13. repec:fth:prinin:380 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. L. M. Mead, . "Welfare policy: The administrative frontier," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1093-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
  15. Card, David & Robins, Philip K., 2005. "How important are "entry effects" in financial incentive programs for welfare recipients? Experimental evidence from the Self-Sufficiency Project," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1-2), pages 113-139.
  16. Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf, 2003. "Benefit duration and unemployment entry: A quasi-experiment in Austria," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 259-273, April.
  17. Card, David & Hyslop, Dean R., 2009. "The dynamic effects of an earnings subsidy for long-term welfare recipients: Evidence from the self sufficiency project applicant experiment," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 153(1), pages 1-20, November.

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